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David Lawrence, daily Washington politico-critic, wrote a
special newspaper syndicate article analyzing the Gold Clause
cases. At one point in it he drew emphatic attention to the
previous political connections of the Justices writing the opin-
ions. Here was Chief Justice Hughes, he said, a former Re-
publican candidate for President, writing the forceful opinion
which largely upheld the action of A Democratic Congress and
a Democratic administration. On the other hand here was
Justice McReynolds, a former Democratic Attorney-General,
writing the vigorous dissent which thoroughly condemned and
invalidated their action. This arrangement, he thought, would
certainly silence those who often charged that previous political
connections influenced the decisions of Supreme Court justices.
Such may all be so. No doubt judges do not allow their
former partisanship to play a part in their judgments. But hav-
ing dismissed the factor of actual party membership what about
other factors to which Mr. Lawrence makes no reference in his
article? What, for example, as to fundamental divergences in
economic philosophy? It would seem that this factor was and
is of great importance in many constitutional judgments. For
in the Gold cases as in the recent Minnesota Moratorium and
New York Milk Control Act decisions, all must agree that
deeply imbedded classical economic views intertwining through
the dissenting justices' interpretation of the Constitution carried
the minority to their result. Likewise all must agree that it
was the majority's understanding of modem economic thought
and surrounding economic conditions which guided the affirm-
ing five to uphold these laws.
This introduces the premise which this research will under-
take to affirm or deny. Such a conclusion as to the effect of thejustices' economic philosophy on the results of these three
famous contemporary decisions suggests a generalization. It
seems to expand into the contention that in these fields of the
law involving large scale human relationships and the clash of
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property interests the course of decisions is determined not so
much by precedent and principle as by implicit social prejudices,
economic sets of mind, and environmental impressions which
are woven into the mental fabric of our judges.
With this premise set up as the basis for study a particular
line of cases has been selected to test out its validity. That line
of decisions will be the entire group of Federal Supreme Court
cases involving the issue of Organized Labor versus Capital.
The Supreme Court was decided upon as the appropriate forum
because of the relatively few, yet tremendously important char-
acter of the labor cases decided before it; and because the mem-
bers of this court of all courts should be most free from any
outside factors and influences. As to why this particular line
of cases, a longer explanation is necessary. The choice is bound
up with a second premise: that Capital and Labor have an
irreconciable conflict of economic interest. No collection of facts
will be adduced to support this second premise. For final judg-
ment as to its truth or falsity is not the subject of this research.
But since the traditional view denies the existence of any conflict
a brief statement of the steps taken in arriving at this premise
should be pointed out.
There are two fundamental drives which motivate our
present American economy. Capital is driving for larger profits,
higher salaries and bonuses. And Labor is driving for higher
wages, more security against unemployment, old age, sickness,
and an all-around better standard of living. The money to
satisfy both must come from the same common fund. Who
obtains the larger per capita share of this fund? Capital does.
Why? Because Capital by owning and controlling the means
of production dictates on what terms it will buy the labor of
the workingman. He either works for Capital or he starves.
This is but another way of saying that Capital will determine
what part of the common fund it will give labor. Thus the
existence of the conflict becomes apparent. However, unless
there is a scarcity in the labor market, the individual laboring
man has no lever to use in his efforts to obtain the higher wages
he constantly wants. And so we see that wherever employes
have not organized into bona fide labor organizations relations
between employers and employes remain exactly as Capital
dictates. And there thus appears to be no conflict. But where
Labor has formed actual collective organization it has imple-
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mented itself with economic pressure and thus gained a real
force to aid in its drive for a larger distribution of the common
fund. Here then we find constant evidences of the conflict.
Once one recognizes this basic divergence he is not confused
by generous signs (recreation fields, Christmas bonuses, em-
ploye club rooms, annual picnics) which appear to give the lie
to the actuality of the conflict. For he sees them as intelligent
benevolences whose chief purpose is to keep employees con-
tented and satisfied. Nor does he accept the view that the
wide-spread ownership of stock, savings bank deposits and
Building and Loan certificates proves dearly that there are no
class lines. For he realizes that this diversification of the partial
ownership of capital effectively screens the conflict but does
not eliminate it. It is true that the small contributions of thou-
sands upon thousands through the purchase of stock, insurance,
and certificates have aided considerably in furnishing capital to
develop our industries. But in a practical sense he knows these
small holders are not the owners of industry. Berle and Means
in their recent book, "The Modern Corporation," have defi-
nitely exploded this long-believed theory of the supposed wide
diversification of our industrial ownership. One who under-
.stands this, cuts through this screen and sees that in spite of it
there are still two classes in America. On one side are those
whose chief means of income is derived from their ownership
of stocks, bonds, their receipt of rents, unearned increment,
bonuses, and excessive salaries as managers and high executives
of industry. On the other side are those whose chief income
comes from their small salaries and wages as employes.
Convinced that this conflict exists and realizing that it goes
right to the heart of our whole national economy I felt that this
would offer an excellent field to measure the extent to which
judges are influenced by factors outside the law books. For the
question actually posed for decision was simple and direct.
Who should be favored-the owning class or the working class
-Capital or Labor? Biographical research told me little as
to the specific forces that had produced these men who were
to answer that question. But it did tell me that with but one
or two exceptions they all came from the upper strata of Ameri-
can life. Family, position of wealth, degree of education, other
background, all indicated they were to be identified with the
owning class.
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Then I turned to the cases. After I had analyzed each of
them I found that four must be ruled from my tabulation in
order to keep my results accurate. For these four so decidedly
involved some different principle of constitutional law that
they could not be employed in my study. Thus I excluded
from my summaries the first Coronado Coal Co. case (i i),
National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers case
(I 3), and the Industrial Association case (15) which were held
by united courts to concern questions entirely apart from inter-
state commerce. I also excluded the Pennsylvania R. R. cases
(12) which concerned statutory construction alone. Only one
interpretation was possible. The Railroad Labor Board had no
power to enforce its decision. But since the judicial votes on
these cases were 18 for Capital and 18 for Labor, inclusion
would not have varied the ultimate conclusion to be drawn
from the figures.
The material has been arranged in three divisions. First
will come a comprehensive chart with complete tabulation of
the judges and their votes on each case. Next a few pages of
observations and finally an Appendix-Digest of the Cases.
Twenty-two justices considered twenty cases. Sixteen cases
squarely raised the issue. Should Capital or Labor be favored?
Ninety-one judicial votes were cast for the former as against
37 for the latter. And this wide disparity becomes even more
emphatic with the analysis of the labor tallies. Holmes con-
tributed 9, Brandeis 7, and Clarke 5, for a total of 2 1 out of
the 37. Three justices out of twenty-two supply about three-
fifths of the labor vote. Ftirther a case by case comparison of
the records of Holmes, Brandeis and Clarke with McKenna,
Vandevanter, and McReynolds bring out most clearly the
great divergence of approach and opinion. Such divergence
seemingly is not the result of accident or chance. It can only
be explained in terms of differing social and economic outlook.
I previously noted the background of these justices to be
that of the owning classes. The results would strongly suggest
that the set of mind which normally could be expected to be
the product of such background was caried over into their deci-
sions. Typical analyses of the position taken by those justices
favoring Capital offer good ground for such a conclusion. One
approach goes like this. Has the business of the plaintiffs been
damaged by the activities of the defendants? Yes it has. Is the
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business in any possible way tied up with interstate commerce?
It is. Ergo, the defendants are maliciously conspiring in re-
straint of trade and subject to the Sherman Anti-trust Law for
such conspiracy. Hardly a word ever appears as to the objec-
tives of the defendants' action and a suggested justification for
their acts. The other approach goes like this: The right of a
man to carry on his business is a property right. Part of this
property includes the right to hire and fire without interference.
For his right of freedom of contract must be held inviolate.
Therefore any legislation which attempts to make it criminal
to fire a man for union activity or to restrict an employer in his
use of the Injunction to protect his business is unconstitutional
as violating either the 5th or the 14th Amendment. Remem-
bering the background of the judges the overwhelming major-
ity in support of Capital is not in the least odd. The strange
thing is that a few of these twenty-two had sufficient open
mindedness and understanding of Labor's viewpoint to run
upstream against the general flow of pro-Capital sentiment.
So far this summary has dealt only with two categories.
Pro-capital or Pro-labor. But as in all other categorical at-
tempts there is always a twilight zone between the different
classifications. Here this is evidenced by the united court of
1929 upholding the Railway Clerks injunction against the in-
terference of the Texas and N. 0. R. Co. with their collective
bargaining organization. This case sustained Labor on a point
comparable to that in the Adair case. This change in sentiment
after the passage of twenty years resulted from approaching
the problem not from the employer's standpoint-freedom of
contract and the unfettered right to lay down conditions of
employment, but from the recognized right of employes to
organize, followed by its corollary that such right must be pro-
tected by imposing the correlative duty of non-interference and
non-coercion on the employer.
The impossibility of watertightness is also seen in the Labor
records of Justices McKenna, Day, Pitney, Holmes, Brandeis
and Hughes.
Justice McKenna handed down a very liberal dissent in the
Adair case bringing out quite forceably that the statute there
involved was to avoid the recurrence of the general railroad
strike of i894-and therefore should be upheld. But after
that case he became an uncompromising supporter of Capital
right straight through to his retirement.
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Justice Day jumped out of his usual pro-Capital approach
to support Labor in his Coppage dissent and the Paine majority.
The Coppage dissent was the result of a conflicting loyalty that
states should be allowed to reasonably exercise their police
power without the fourteenth amendment being allowed to
strike such legislation down. The Paine case is not definitely
explainable.
Justice Pitney broke from an intensely partisan line of opin-
ions in favor of Capital to dissent in the Truax case. But he
does it on the same ground as Day in the Coppage case.
Justice Holmes' Supreme Court opinions have always
upheld collective bargaining. They have also affirmed the right
of Congress and state legislatures to make collective bargaining
more than an empty phrase-to protect it from annihilating
interference by Capital.
Apart from the right of collective bargaining there is a
conflict in his views. There is a noticeable change in his view-
point as to the legality of boycott and sympathetic strikes. In
1914 he wrote the Court's opinion in the second Danbury Hat-
ters case upholding the awarding of treble damages against the
Union for illegal conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade.
But with the coming of the Clayton Act we see him lining up
with Brandeis and Clarke in exempting Labor from the dev-
astating curtailment of action brought about by a continued
application of the Anti-trust act. If Congress gave bread he
refused to turn it to stone.
But beyond this Holmes is unwilling to go. Affirmation of
the hard ugly realities of Labor tactics was not part of his credo.
We see this aversion to mass picketing, violent language and
threats, in his participation in the majority of the Tri-City
Trades case and Coronado second.
Justice Brandeis has brought to the Court a most sympa-
thetic understanding and appreciation of Labor's struggle. His
dissents in the Hitchman, Duplex, Truax, and Stonecutters
cases show judicial forthrightness and judicial realism at its
best. One could limit his Labor readings to these four opinions
and be still well posted on the true Labor viewpoint. But even
Justice Brandeis shrinks from the brutality that has been an
unfortunate part of mass economic pressure as witness his con-
currence in the Tri-City Trades case.
Chief Justice Hughes has participated in three Labor deci-
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sions. He dissented from the Coppage majority but the same
year supported the treble damages award in Danbury Hatters
second. His only pronouncement since his return to the Court
was his excellent realistic united Court opinion in the Railway
Clerks case.
We have called these exceptions the twilight zone. The
admission that such an area exists and the enumeration of the
justices belonging in it do not detract from the implications of
the totals mentioned earlier. Rather they merely add realism
to a picture that might otherwise seem to precise and classified.
It softens the attempt to absolutely straight jacket each of
these justices into one view or the other. But it does not divert
the incontrovertible trend of these cases.
The purpose of this study is to test a premise through the
consideration of one particular line of cases-Organized Labor
vs. Capital. The ratio of over 2 to i in favor of Capital and the
significance of about three-fifths of the Labor vote coming from
three judges noted for their fairness and impartiality slants
directly towards the validity of that premise as here tested.
And so until more facts are brought to light or a different
analysis of these cases from that made here is produced, it can
be asstimed that in these fields of the law involving large scale
human relationships and the clash of property interest, the
course of decisions is determined not so much by precedent and
principle as by implicit social prejudices, economic sets of mind,
and environmental impressions which are woven into the men-
tal fabric of our judges.
(i) In re Debs (1894). Government had obtained an injunction against the
American Railwaymen's Union to prevent obstruction of interstate commerce
and interference with the passage of the mails. Debs violated this and was
jailed for contempt.
Court's Opinion by Brewer. The Court denied appeal from the refusal
of court below to grant habeas corpus. The petitioners counsel had drawn the
Court's attention to the heroic spirit of self sacrifice of these men who gave
up their jobs not in defense of their own rights but in sympathy for those
whom they though had been wronged. The Court turned this aside with the
reminder that the means of redress of all wrongs is through the court and at
the ballot box and that no wrong, real or fancied carries with it legal warrant
to invite as means of redress the cooperation of a mob with its accompanying
acts of violence.
(2) Adair vs. United States (x907). Congress passed an act making it crim-
inal for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce or agent thereof to discharge
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an employee simply because of his membership in a labor organization. Party
indicted and convicted raises question of constitutionality.
Court's Opinion by Harlan. The Court without considering the reasons
behind the act determined that it was a dear invasion of the liberty of contract
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and that there was no relation between
the act and the power of Congress over interstate commerce. The Court said
that the right of the employee to sell labor upon such terms as he deems proper
is in its essence the same right as the right of purchaser of labor to prescribe
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from person offering to sell it.
McKenna (dissent). McKenna felt that the liberty of contract was not
absolute and was properly qualified here by Congress in its effort to prevent
any future obstructions to interstate commerce such as the Pullman Car Strike
produced. To prevent discharge for union affiliation seemed a reasonable
means to prevent such future interference.
Holmes (dissent). Holmes believed that the Fifth Amendment had
already been stretched too far in its protection of the freedom of contract. It
could and should be here qualified.
(3) Danbury Hatters Cases. Loewe v. Lawlor (1907) and Lawlor v. Loewe
(1914).
The first case arose on demurrer to action for treble damages under Sher-
amn Anti-trust act. It was claimed that the nationwide boycott of the goods
of plaintiff by defendants and the publication of plaintiff's name on various
unfair lists resulting in reduced purchases of plaintiff's product was conspiracy
in restraint of interstate trade.
The second case was error from judgment of treble damages in the Fed-
eral court below.
Court's Opinions by Fuller and Holmes. This was an unlawful com-
bination which was aimed at and produced burden on the plaintiff's interstate
liberty to trade and the free flow of commerce.
(4) Buck Stove and Range Co. vs. Gompers (191o). The defendants were
jailed for contempt in violation of injunction against further publication of
the plaintiff's name as unfair to organized labor. Was this jailing proper?
Court's Opinion by Lamar. Criminal contempt requires separate action
of criminal nature and therefore such jailing was improper. Before arriving
at this procedural result the Court found occasion to say that it was the duty
of equity to protect the one who was made helpless in face of the vast accu-
mulated power of labor bodies arising from the multitudes of members therein.
Lawful to form organizations but not lawful to boycott and force into submis-
sion anyone who will not accept labor's terms.
(5) Coppage v. Kansas (19z4). Kansas had passed an act identical with the
congressional act in the Adair case. Here however there was a different phase
contested. Namely that it was unlawful to coerce, demand, or compel any
persons to accept as a condition of employment that they would refrain from
joining any labor organization. Coppage was indicted thereunder.
Court's Opinion by Pitney. Court decided Adair case controlled and
therefore act unconstitutional. In answer to the argument that such act would
place the parties to the employment contract on a more equal basis and thus
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better the employes financially the court stated.--"And since it is self-evident
that unless all things are held in common some persons must have more prop-
erty than others it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom
of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recog-
nizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of
the exercise of those rights."
Holmes (dissent). Workingmen not unnaturally may believe that only
by belonging to unions can they secure a contract fair to them. Being reason-
able belief the right to belong may be enforced by law in order to establish
the equality of position in which liberty of contract begins.
Day and Hughes (dissent). It is dearly established by this Court that
liberty of contract may be circumscribed in the interest of the state and the
welfare of its people. This act was intended to promote the same liberty of
action for the employe as the employer confessedly enjoys. They distinguished
the Adair case because that was in regard to the employer's right to discharge
at will.
(6) Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (r915). Certain carpenter unions had agree-
ments with master carpenters and builders to hire only union members and
use only union made goods. The plaintiffs running non-union shop lost
many sales of their products and sought injunction.
Court's Opinion by Holmes. Private persons cannot gain injunction
under the 189o Anti-trust Act.
Pitney, Van, Devanter, McKenna, amd McReynolds (dissent). The de-
fendants are engaged in a boycotting combination in restraint of interstate
trade. Proof being clear that the conspiracy was aimed at property rights of
plaintiffs and driving non-union shops out of business therefore there is power
in equity to enjoin such combination apart from any absence of reference in
the Sherman act.
(7) Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell (19x7). The Coal Co. had
formed contracts with men which required them to refrain from joining union
as condition of employment and to cease employment if at any time they
joined union. The defendants sought to organize the men regardless of their
contracts and hired an agent to carry on such program. The plaintiffs seek
injunction against such activity.
Court's Opinion by Pitney. The court upheld the granting of such in-
junction. Court said that whatever may be advantages of collective bargain-
ing it is not bargaining at all in any sense unless it is voluntary on both sides.
The same liberty which enables men to form union and through the union
to enter into agreements with employes willing to agree entitles other men
to remain independent of the union and other employers to agree with them
to employ no man who owes any alligiance or obligation to the union.
Brandies, Holmes, and Clarhe rdissent). The end being lawful (unioni-
2;ation-inserted by writer) defendants' efforts to unionize the mine can be
illegal only if methods or means pursued were unlawful. The dissent through
additional facts and by a different slant on the facts brought out by the ma-
jority showed that the employes had not actually joined the union and until
they did there was no third party contractual interference which might be
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construed as actionable. Further Brandies deflated the words characteris-
tically used in these injunctions against labor unions--coerce, intimidate,
maliciously threaten. "The employer may sign the union agreement for fear
that labor may not be otherwise obtainable; the workingman may sign the
individual agreement for fear that employment may not be otherwise obtain-
able. But such fear does not imply coercion in the legal sense."
(8) Duplex Co. v. Deering (r92o). The plaintiff manufactured printing
presses and was located in Michigan. It refused to permit unionization of
its men by the Machinists International. The union attempted to enforce the
same by boycott and sympathetic strike of affiliated locals working for custo-
mers of the plaintiff or doing business with plaintiff in other ways. Injunc-
tion asked for claiming conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade.
Court's Opinion by Pitney. The court grants injunction. In process of
showing clear conspiracy it restricted the words of the new Clayton act which
by Section 20 attempted to greatly curtail the use of injunctions. It points
out that such section imposed an exceptional and extraordinary restriction
upon equity courts and therefore should be given a very strict construction.
As a result sympathetic strikes and secondary boycotts were declared to remain
illegal conspiracies. In referring to the section exempting peaceful persuasion
from injunctions it stated that the instigation of a sympathetic strike in aid of
a secondary boycott cannot be deemed peaceful persuasion.
Branduies, Holmes, and Clarke (dissent). The Clayton act must be re-
membered to be the result of twenty years effort to remove the normal eco-
nomic pressure activities of unions from the deathly blight of common law
conspiracy. Judges for years had set up themselves in their chancellor robes
as the supreme arbiters of trade union conduct-judges whose social and eco-
nomic views constantly aided the employers in their fight against unions.
Congress finally felt that it should substitute its views as to rules of conduct
of the conflict for those of the federal courtts. Therefore the words of this
section should be construed as to exempt the present boycott from injunctions
as long as such were carried on legally.
The dissent added very important facts which showed that the Duplex
Co. was the only one of the four companies making printing presses which
was not unionized and that these other companies had served notice that unless
the Duplex Co. accepted union terms they must break their agreements.
(9) American Steel Foundries v. Tri City Trades Council (592z). This
case raised another phase of Section 20 o fthe Clayton act. To what extent
can the injunction still be used to enjoin picketing in light of words immuniz-
ing peaceful persuasion?
Court's Opinion by Taft. The court states that evidence showed such
violence was employed as to characterize the attitude of pickets as continu-
ously threatening. It is idle to talk of peaceful communication under such
conditions. Numbers constituted intimidation. Employes had to run the
gauntlet. Such picketing was unlawful. It was decided therefore to limit the
strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the economic struggle to one repre-
sentative for each point of ingress and egress. Clayton act was said to have
no bearing because it merely declared what was previous good equity procedure.
Brandies (concurs) and Clarke (dissents).
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(io) Truax v. Corrigan (Z92 .) Law identical with Clayton act passed by
Arizona. Plaintiff restaurant owner suffered great loss of business from peace-
ful boycott and strike. Attempts to obtain injunction. State courts refused.
Appeal on ground of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court's Opinion: by Taft. The means of defendants were unlawful.
Palpable wrongs, libellous attacks, abusive epithets, loud appeals were a nuis-
ance to free access to plaintiff's business. Would be customers were compelled
to run the gauntlet of most uncomfortable publicity and possible injurious con-
sequences. Any state law that allows such acts is against the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Further such law denies equal protection of laws. Such a classification
excluding the injunction as means of defending property is said to be a worth-
while experiment. But when fundamental rights are thus attempted to be
taken away we may well subject such experiment to attentive judgments. The
constitution was intended, its very purpose was to prevent experimentation
with the fundamental rights of the individual.
Holmes (dissent). Business may have pecuniary value and commonly is
protected by law against various unjustified injuries. But you cannot give it
definiteness of contour by calling it a thing. It is a course of conduct and like
other conduct is subject to substantial modification.
Pitney and Clarke (dissent). The establishment or disestablishment of
injunctive protection against picketing can be handled by a state without
invading property. Ordinary legal remedies remain and I cannot believe that
use of injunction in such cases however important, is so essential to right of
acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property that its restriction or elimination
amounts to a deprivation of liberty or property. Upon the facts it hardly
could be said that defendants kept within bounds of peaceful picketing or
boycott. But we must follow state court's pronouncement that statute pre-
scribed new rule of evidence for determining whether picketing was lawful
and under that rule the defendants actions are alright.
Brandies (dissent). "Practically every change in law governing relation
of employer and employe must abridge in some respect the liberty or property
of one of the parties if liberty and property be measured by the standard here-
tofore prevailing." Further there is equal protection of laws for few laws
are of universal application. "Peculiar relationship of individuals such as
the present one furnishes legal basis for classification satisfying the fourteenth."
(I I) Coronado Coal Co. Cases (Z922) and (z924). Mine attempted to run
non-union in union area. Strike, shutdown, intention to open non-union.
Fire and wholesale loss of property resulted from an attack alleged to be led by
District 21 of the United Mine Workers. Lower courts in first case found
conspiracy to interfere with interstate trade and gave treble damages under
the Sherman actt. In second case additional facts offered to make out the
interference alleged.
Court Opinion by Taft. The Court was unable to find interference in
the first case sufficient to warrant invoking the Anti-trust act. But it clearly
wanted to. For it speaks of palpable damage and felonious, lawless, murder-
ous conduct. Said that "circumstances were such as to awaken regret that in
their view of the federal jurisdiction they could not affirm the Judgment.
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But it is of far higher importance that the fundamental limitations in respect
to federal jurisdiction be preserved inviolate."
With the added facts disclosed in the second case so as to show conspir-
acy to interfere with interstate commerce the court reversed the lower courts
direction of verdict against District 21.
(xz) Pennsylvania R. R. v. U. S. Railroad Labor Board (1922) and (1924).
In the 1922 case the decision of Board held to be dependent for enforcement
on mere moral suasion. The 1924 decision was same in result. The cases
are considered as one for tabulation.
Court Opinion by Taft. Seeking to control employes by agreements to
maintain freedom from influence of independent unions, refusal to comply
with Labor Board's ruling, threatening discharge to force agreement as to
wages which its own picked representation had agreed to, all these things
might be done and the Railroad remain within its strict legal rights.
(3) National Association of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States
(Z923). With Holmes writing the opinion the united court determined that
an agreement between the glass workers union and the association to spread out
work and guarantee labor was not contra to Anti-trust act. For it in no way
affected interstate commerce.
(4) United Leather Workers v. Herkert (X923). The court with Taft
writing opinion refused to find that the picketing and striking as well as
alleged boycott were a conspiracy which interfered with interstate commerce.
McKenna, Van Devanter and Butlet (dissent)
(I5) Industrial Associaton v. United States (X924). Unanimous court
speaking through Sutherland held that there was no conspiracy in restraint of
interstate commerce where San Francisco Building contractors formed Builders
Exchange which would not dispense any building materials unless the builder
would agree to operate non-union.
(6) Bedford Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters (z926). Plaintiff
sought to enjoin national order of General Union to refrain from working on
any stone produced by plaintiff. Actually the General Union in effort to
reunionize the plaintiffs had ordered their members over the country to not
work on any stone which had been worked on by men working in opposition
to the general union. Such had caused substantial loss in plaintiff's business.
Court Opinion by Sutherland. The Court held that such was conspiracy
in restraint of interstate trade and within the authority of the Duplex Co.
case.
Sanford (concurred). On authority of Duplex Co. case.
Stone (concurred). He did so in thes words. "As an original proposi-
tion I doubt whether Sherman act prohibited labor union from peaceably re-
fusing to work on material produced by non-union labor even though inter-
state commerce affected. But concurred on strength of Duplex Co. case.
Brandeis and Holmes (dissent). They considered the restraint not an
unreaonable one but one arising in the struggle for existence where individual
workingmen are cooperating for self protection. The Sherman act was held
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in United States v. Steel Corporation to permit capitalists to combine in a
single corporation 50% of steel industry of United States dominating the
trade through its vast resources-. It would indeed be strange if Congress by
the same act willed to deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the
right to cooperate simply refraining to work when that course was the only
means of self protection against a combination of militant and powerful em-
ployers." They cannot believe that Congress did so.
(17) Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks (Z929). The Railway Labor
act of 1926 stated that representatives for the purposes of the act shall be
designated by the respective parties-without interference, influence or coer-
cion exercised by either party over the self organization or designation of
representatives by the other. The Railroad had sponsored company union
against which the plaintiffs attempted to obtain injunction.
Court's Opinimo by Hughes. This upheld injunction. Congress could
take steps to safeguard the employes collective action. Such would be mockery
if representation was made futile by interferences with freedom of choice.
Instead of this being an invasion of constitutional rights it was recognition of
both. Petitioners invoke the Adair and Coppage cases. But the present act
does not interfere with normal exercise of the right of carrier to select its
employes or discharge them. The statute is not aimed at this right of the
employers but at the interference with the right of employers to have repre-
sentatives of their own choosing.
